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Abstract 
Recent investigation of sovereign debt negotiations finds that prompt, market-friendly ‘reprofiling’ 
often fails to achieve sustainability; but serious debt restructuring typically involves delay. We 
develop an incomplete information bargaining model to account for this, highlighting economic 
recovery and sustainability considerations as complementary reasons for delay. Some recent 
settlements are discussed along with policy implications of excessive profiling.  
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Section 1: Introduction 
Sovereigns in default are, in practice, faced with a choice between two types of debt renegotiation - 
reprofiling or restructuring. This is the conclusion of a recent extensive study of foreign currency debt 
negotiations by Mariscal et. al. (2015). In the terminology of IMF (2014), reprofilings are relatively 
fast, they may be pre-emptive (in the sense that they are announced before the country actually enters 
default) and frequently have a zero 'haircut' of principal. Restructurings, on the other hand, do have 
face value haircuts, have deeper reductions of present value and are typically arranged ex post. For 
foreign currency bonds, the average haircut for "reprofiling" is about 15 percent while for 
"restructuring" it is some 50 percent. 
Because over 40 percent of reprofilings are, in practice, followed by a second reprofiling or 
restructuring within 6 years, however, the authors argue that quick, market-friendly settlements "may 
not actually solve the underlying debt problem". To explain the attraction of prompt but inadequate 
settlements in their economic model of the debtor country, Mariscal et. al. (2015), hereafter MPST, 
add exogenous output costs - which are three times greater for restructuring.  
What light might bargaining theory throw on why some settlements take longer than others and 
embody greater debt reductions? That is the issue addressed in this paper.   
It is, of course, true that prompt agreement is a key feature of the basic single-creditor, complete 
information bargaining models of sovereign debt restructuring often used: where preferences and the 
size of the pie to be divided are known, this is what the ‘alternating offers’ approach of Rubinstein 
(1982) delivers. But several reasons for delay have been also been considered in the literature. Merlo 
and Wilson (1995), hereafter MW, showed that delay may prove beneficial where it permits the debtor 
country's economy to recover from a crisis; and it may act as a signal between participants with 
asymmetric information, Rubinstein (1985). Problems of creditor coordination and creditor 
heterogeneity have also been explored, Pitchford and Wright (2012), Ghosal and Miller (2016); and 
the role of political factors, as in Trebesch (2016). 
In this paper, we present an incomplete information model of debt restructuring with a representative 
private bondholder which combines two of these features. Delay occurs along the equilibrium path of 
play driven firstly by the prospect of uncertain economic recovery; and also as a means of signalling 
sustainability concerns by the debtor state. The length of delay is positively correlated with the size of 
the haircut: while one-period delay permits economic recovery, multi-period delay allows the debtor 
state to signal the need for a larger "haircut". 
What this provides is an endogenous account of delay, based on the incentives of the participants in a 
process of bargaining; and a rationale for the correlation between length of delay and size of write-
down noted by MPST. It also offers a reason for why there may be too many quick but inadequate 
settlements: when the costs of signalling are too high for the debtor, it doesn't get a "fresh start" with 
substantial debt reduction. 
As an appropriate indicator of what restructuring might be needed for heavily indebted poor countries, 
for example, the Paris Club adopted progress toward the Millenium Development Goals. More 
generally, transparency has been identified as one of the basic principles for efficient sovereign debt 
restructuring by the UNCTAD (UN General Assembly, 2015). Potentially, the IMF could resolve 
uncertainty about future growth or sustainability concerns where these are in dispute. But its position 
as senior creditor may limit its ability to play that role.  
In the absence of an institutional solution for overseeing debt restructuring for higher income 
countries, contractual alternatives offer an alternative: Brooke et. al. (2013), for example, make a case 
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for adopting sovereign CoCos and GDP-indexed bonds ex ante so as to help align the debtor’s 
commitments with its capacity to pay. 
Related Literature 
The evidence that sovereign bond restructurings involve costly delay is extensive, see for example 
Cruces and Trebesch (2013), Roubini and Setser (2004b) and the monograph by Sturzenegger and 
Zettlemeyer (2007). 
In a carefully calibrated model of sovereign default, with debt renegotiation modelled along the lines 
of MW, Bi (2008) finds that delay was beneficial for Argentina as it gave the economy breathing-
space to recover from deep recession. While multi-period delay can arise in this framework, delay 
length may be negatively correlated with haircut size. 
Asymmetric information as a cause of delay in sovereign debt restructuring is explored in Bai and 
Zhang (2012). In this case, it is the creditor's reservation value that is private information, and the 
debtor government knows only its distribution: delays in reaching agreements arise in equilibrium 
because the debtor uses costly delay to screen the creditors' reservation value.   In contrast, in our 
paper, it is the debtor's type that is private information. For Bai and Zhang, moreover, the key fact to 
be explained is that 'sovereign debt renegotiations take an average of five years for bank loans but only 
one year for bonds' and the explanation advanced is that the secondary market for bonds provides 
information on creditors reservation value. In this paper, however, the key fact to be explained is why 
prolonged delay may occur even with bonds. 
How lack of commitment may bedevil negotiations is explored in the comprehensive study by 
Benjamin and Wright (2016), where the rationale for delay in settling is that the creditor's ability to 
share in the future surplus is threatened by the risk that the debtor will default on what is agreed. The 
data set they examine (and use in quantifying their model) includes bank loans as well as bonds; and 
the data period (since 1970) includes the "lost decade" of the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s. 
It has been argued, however, (by MW amongst others) that the a substantial reason for delay at that 
time was the risk that prompt write-downs of syndicated bank loans would have wiped out the equity 
of key banks in the US financial system. 
By assuming that debt restructuring involves bargaining with a representative private bondholder, we 
abstract from problems of coordination among multiple private creditors. There is an extensive - and 
growing - literature on this topic, see, for example, Kletzer (2002), Ghosal and Miller (2003), 
Weinschelbaum and Wynne(2005), Pitchford and Wright (2012) and Ghosal and Thampanishvong 
(2013). As the factors generating multi- period delay we examine do not, in an essential way, require 
multiple private creditors, such considerations are omitted from the formal model; but the role of 
specialist hold-out creditors is discussed in considering the case of Argentina. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a simple three period 
bargaining model. In Section 3, after brief discussion of some settlements involving substantial 
haircuts, we outline the challenge offered by the Greek debt swap of 2011/12 and the recent decision 
in favour of holdouts from the Argentine restructuring; and consider various policy implications. 
Section 4 concludes. The appendix contains the infinite horizon extension of the three period 
incomplete information model studied in the main text.  
Section 2: A model of recovery, sustainability and delay in bargaining 
 
To highlight the factors on which our analysis is focussed, we begin by first reviewing the MW logic 
for delay – postponing a settlement so as to allow for economic recovery. Then we look at the case 
where the uncertainty is about the type of the debtor. Assuming that the creditor’s acceptance of 
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sustainability requirements shifts the bargaining position in favour of the debtor, but there is 
asymmetric information about the debtor’s type, we show how this may give rise to a signalling 
equilibrium with delay; and use parameters from MPST to check the consistency of our results with 
their empirical findings.. 
After these preliminaries, both factors are combined in a three-period model, where we find conditions 
for longer delay, first to allow for economic recovery and then for signalling. An infinite horizon 
extension of this three-period bargaining model is provided in the Appendix.  
2.1 Waiting for recovery 
 
Conditional on default, we assume there is bargaining between debtor and creditor over restructuring 
sovereign debt. The bargaining surplus is the additional tax revenue generated to the sovereign debtor 
by gaining access to the international capital market once the outstanding debt has been successfully 
restructured. We suppose that the debtor uses the tax revenue for one of the two reasons, either spending 
on a public good or debt repayment. Debt repayment requires the debtor to divert funds away from 
expenditure on the public good (e.g. cutting expenditure on public services (austerity) to run a primary 
budget surplus). The debtor's "offer" to the creditor then corresponds to the amount of tax revenue 
diverted from public good provision. We will denote the total tax revenue available for bargaining as π   
> 0, and refer to it as ‘the pie’. 
 
The analysis begins at a point at which the debtor is in default and in a recession, i.e. we assume that 
the value of π  at the initial period, immediately after default, is low and is denoted by Lπ . However, we 
allow the future value to be stochastic so that π  can continue to be low at Lπ  with probability p   or  
grow  to a  higher  level,  Hπ ,  with probability  1 p− , where the probabilities are common knowledge 
and the growth of π  corresponds to an increase in the tax revenue. The bargaining model formalizes the 
argument that in the initial period, the current surplus, Lπ , can be shared between debtor or creditor, but 
doing so means giving up on the prospect of economic growth, i.e. this is a primitive endogenous 
growth model. 
 
Assume, for convenience, that creditor and debtor share a common discount factor 1δ < .1 If  no 
contingent contracts can be written, we find that delay will occur when the expected increase in the pie 
exceeds the interest rate. Although their infinite horizon analysis makes the analysis much less 
straightforward, this is the principal feature of the equilibria in Merlo and Wilson (1998), who cite the 
delay in restructuring Latin American debt in the 1980s as an illustration of their approach.  
 
The bargaining game is specified as follows. The debtor makes the offer in the first period; but each 
party has equal probability of making an offer (being the proposer) in the subsequent period. In the 
second (and final) period, bargaining takes the form of an ultimatum game, where the proposer takes 
all. Breakdown payoffs are zero for both players. (It is assumed that offers matching breakdown 
payoffs will be accepted.)  
 
Table 1 illustrates, with the debtor’s payoff first, depending on the state of the economy and who 
makes the offer. 
 
                                                 
1 An assumption that is relaxed when it comes to calibration. 
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 Depression 
(p) 
Recovery 
(1-p) 
Debtor’ s Offer 
(1/2) 
,0Lπ  ,0Hπ  
Creditor’s Offer 
(1/2) 
0, Lπ  0, Hπ  
 
Table 1 Final period payoffs (probabilities shown in parentheses) 
 
Moving to the first period, we calculate the continuation values. Bearing in mind that the choice of 
proposer in the second period depends on the toss of a coin and that there is a common discount factor 
δ, the continuation value is the same for each player, namely 
2
Eδ π , where 
(1 )L HE p pπ π π= + − denotes the expected size of the pie.  
 
In the first period, with debtor as proposer, these continuation values limit the offers that can be made. 
The current pie can be shared between debtor or creditor; but doing so means giving up on the 
prospect for economic growth. Formally, whenever, the expected growth of the economy, 
L
L
E Egπ π
π
−
= > 1r δ
δ
−
= , the time rate of discount, there will be delay. If, for example, the rapid 
Argentine recovery of about 8% per annum had been expected, this would have exceeded the real 
interest rate of 5% assumed by Bi (2008), who uses detailed calibration to argue that this was indeed a 
case of extended ‘efficient delay’.Figure 1 depicts the situation, with debtor payoffs on the horizontal 
payoff and the creditor payoffs on the vertical axis.  Pareto-efficient current settlements lie on the 
downward-sloping line labelled “current pie”, the boundary of the set of feasible settlements. Future 
growth prospects, summarized by the continuation values, lie on the upward-sloping 45 degree line, a 
reflection of the ex-ante symmetry of bargaining power in the second period. These continuation 
values lie outside the “current pie” when Eg r> and inside if growth prospects fall short. 
δEπ/2 
A
0
Debtor payoff
Creditor payoff payoff  
R
Current
 Pie
E 
G
Continuation 
Values
Creditor accepts
Creditor rejects
B 
πL 
πL δEπ/2 
 
Figure 1: Continuation values and ‘efficient’ delay 
 6 
 
Note that continuation values in the interior of the set of feasible settlements are Pareto-
dominated by points on the line segment AB, i.e. current settlement dominates delay. At point 
E, for example, by offering the creditor no more than its continuation value, the debtor can 
achieve the payoff of A which improves on continuation.  
 
2.2 Signalling concern for sustainability  
 
By allowing information to differ as between creditor and debtor, delay can arise as a costly signal by 
the debtor concerned with sustainability, designed to secure an improvement in continuation game 
payoffs. Specifically, we assume the debtor may be one of two types - one concerned with 
sustainability, the other not- where the debtor knows his type but the creditor is not sure.   
 
The two types of debtor, labelled Cautious and Optimistic, differ in the utility they get from 
consuming their part of a ‘pie’ of size π . For both, utility is linear in their payoff, but for the Cautious 
debtor there is a discontinuity to reflect concern about the sustainability of any settlement. (We 
continue to use a two-period example where there is a common discount factor 1δ < .) The bargaining 
game is specified as follows.  
 
Let π  denote the size of the pie that is to be divided between the debtor and creditor, with no growth 
expected. We assume utility is linear in (equal to) the payoff only for payoffs greater than or equal to 
{0, }s s∈ : for the Optimist debtor 0s =  while for the cautious debtor 0s s= > . Let , ,i i O Cπ =  denote 
the share of the surplus obtained by either the optimist or the cautious debtor. For the Optimistic 
debtor  OOu π=  for any allocation, but for the Cautious debtor this is only true for  C sπ ≥ ; for any 
share strictly less than s ,  0Cu = . The debtor knows his type, the creditor does not, but believes that 
the debtor is Optimistic with probability 0q . (This initial prior is bounded from below for reasons that 
will be made clear.)  
 
The debtor makes the initial offer in the first period; but each party has equal probability of making an 
offer in the subsequent period. Breakdown payoffs are zero for both players in period two.  
 
In the event that delay occurs in period one, however, the debtor enjoys an inside option, Oω , which is 
greater for the Cautious debtor than for the Optimist, i.e. C Oω ω> .2 Consider the Perfect Bayesian 
Equilibria of this bargaining game. 
 
We begin with the ultimatum game in the final period, when the belief of the creditor that the debtor is 
an Optimist has evolved and is denoted 1q . Consider the creditor’s offers at extreme values of 1q . As 
indicated in Table 2a, the offer is zero unless the debtor is thought to be concerned about 
sustainability; in which case it is s .  
 
Creditor’s Belief 
as to Debtor’s type 
Creditor’s offer to Debtor Payoff for Creditor 
1 1q =  (it’s an Optimist) 0 π  
1 0q =  (it’s not) s   sπ −  
Table 2a Creditor’s offers with extreme beliefs 
                                                 
2 We make this assumption purely for expositional convenience in order to show the existence of a signalling equilibrium 
in pure strategies. In the Appendix, in the infinite horizon case, we dispense with this assumption and show the existence 
of a signalling equilibrium in mixed strategies which retains the same qualitative features of the pure strategy separating 
equilibrium but where the expected payoff calculations and expressions are more complicated.  
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For less extreme beliefs, 10 1q< < , the creditor’s expected payoff from a high offer (of s ), acceptable 
to either type, will be  sπ −  ; but the expected payoff from a low offer (of zero) , acceptable only to 
the Optimist, will be 1q π . If 1q sπ π> − , the creditor will do better by making a low offer, and 
conversely for 1q sπ π< − . When 1
sq π
π
−
= , the two offers have the same expected payoff, and we 
assume that the debtor randomises, offering low with probability θ  and high with probability 1 θ− .  
 
To summarise, the creditor’s offers are shown as a function of his priors in the table.  
 
Creditor’s Belief 
as to debtor’s type 
Creditor’s offer Expected payoff for 
creditor 
1
sq π
π
−
>  
(it’s probably an Optimist) 
0 1qπ  
1
sq π
π
−
=  
 0 with probability θ  and 
s  with probability 1 θ−  
1  1 ( )( )q sθπ θ π+ − −  
1
sq π
π
−
<  
(it’s probably Cautious) 
s   sπ −  
Table  2b Creditor’s offers in the ultimatum game for all values of beliefs 
 
As for the debtor, his offer to the creditor is simply zero - which will be accepted in this ultimatum 
game. 
 
From the perspective of the initial period, bearing in mind that each player has a 50% probability of 
making the next offer, the expected discounted payoffs as a function of the prior are as in Table 3: 
 
Creditor’s Belief as to 
debtor’s type 
Expected payoff for debtor 
(for both types) 
Expected Payoff for creditor 
1
sq π
π
−
>  
(probably an Optimist) 
2
δπ  
 
1
2
qδπ  
1
sq π
π
−
=  [ ( ) ]
2
 1 sπ θ δ+ −  ( )1  1[ ( ) ]
2
sq θπ πθ δ+ − −
 
1
sq π
π
−
<  
 
( )
2
 sπ δ+  
 
( )
2
 sπ δ−  
Table 3 Continuation values in the initial period of bargaining 
 
Assume that the debtor makes the offer in the initial period. In a separating equilibrium, the offer 
made by the debtor (denoted by 1,Dx ) will be conditioned on one or other of the extreme priors, as 
follows:  
 
Creditor beliefs 
given the debtor’s 
offer 
Debtor’s payoff Offer to creditor Outcome 
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1 1q = (it’s an 
Optimist) 2
πδπ −  
2
πδ  High offer will induce creditor to 
accept 
1 0q =  (it’s not) 
1, 2 2D
sx πδ δπ π− > − +  ( )
1, 2D
s
x
π δ−
<  
Offer too low to 
be accepted 
                                Table 4 Debtor’s offers in a separating equilibrium 
 
Offers consistent with separation are illustrated in Figure 2, where point B indicates the continuation 
values for the known Optimist and point C for the debtor known to be Cautious. The offer of 
2
πδ  
shown by the horizontal line through B is attractive enough for the creditor to accept given that he 
believes he is dealing with an Optimist; but an offer of 
( )
1, 2D
s
x
π δ−
<  is too low to be accepted by a 
creditor who believes he is dealing with a Cautious debtor as it lies below the full information 
continuation values shown at point C.  These are separating offers.  
 
 x 
Creditor 
accepts 
  0 
Creditor payoff  
A 
π 
π 
B 
s 
δπ / 2 
π − δπ / 2 Debtor payoff 
•  
C 
(π−s) δ/2 
Creditor 
rejects x 
F 
Figure 2 A mean offer from the cautious debtor in a separating equilibrium 
 
Consider now the conditions required to ensure that the types reveal themselves in a separating 
equilibrium with delay: namely (i) that Cautious doesn’t imitate Optimist; (ii) that Optimist doesn’t 
imitate Cautious; and (iii) that Cautious wants to delay.  
 
To ensure that the Cautious debtor reveals himself requires that he will not do better by imitating an 
Optimist, i.e. that the present discounted value of continuing and being identified as Cautious exceeds 
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the benefits of settling quickly, so point C lies to the right of point A in the figure. Thus condition (i) 
requires that  
( )
2
   
2
s πδππ δ+ > −     or       (1 ) 2s δ
π δ
−
> . 
i.e. sustainability concerns have to be sufficiently important to outweigh the cost of delay. If this 
condition is satisfied, then after one period of delay, the cautious debtor will receive a payoff of s  if it 
is the creditor who makes the offer; or the whole pie if he holds all the cards in the ultimatum game.  
 
This could help explain the willingness of sovereigns who choose to wait for a Restructuring. But note 
that where, as in MPST, the discount factor for the debtor is higher than for the creditor, the 
sustainability factor needed for delay will be  larger as  impatience is costly with alternating offers.  
The following table reports a simple calibration showing how adding the usual assumption of an 
impatient debtor (using a discount rate for the debtor that is about three times that for the creditor, as 
in MPST) affects payoffs in our simple signalling model - with results in the middle row broadly 
comparable with the haircuts reported in MPST shown in the last line. .  
 
 Condition 
for no delay 
Haircut with 
no delay  
 
Condition for 
delay  
Expected haircut 
after delay  
Common 
discount rate  
of 7% 
s
π
≤ 14% 
50% s
π
>  14% 
>57% 
Discount rate for 
debtor 3 times 
greater  
s
π
≤  42% 
17% s
π
>  42% 
> 71% 
Average haircuts 
in MPST data  
 “Reprofiling” 
15%  
 “Restructuring” 
50%  
Table 5: ‘Haircuts’ with delay as signal: allowing for ‘impatient’ debtors  
 
If sustainability is a smaller fraction of the pie, however, the gain from delay may not be worthwhile 
for the debtor. This may help to explain the early settlement of the Reprofiling cases reported by 
MPST, a point strengthened by the calculations reported in Table 5.  
 
To verify the other conditions characterizing an equilibrium are satisfied, the inside option ωO 
available to the Optimist needs to be taken into account. To show (ii), that Optimist does not imitate 
Cautious, note that if he does, 1 0q q= . If 0
sq π
π
−
> , and the creditor thinks the debtor is probably an 
Optimist, then the expected payoff for an optimist who delays will be 
2O
δπω + , where Oω is the inside 
option for the Optimist. 
 
To ensure that there is no incentive to imitate Cautious in this way requires that this is less attractive 
than settling, i.e. 
2 2O
δπ δπω π+ < − . As can be seen from rewriting this as (1 )Oω π δ< − , this gives an  
upper bound on the inside option for the Optimist.  
 
 
Will the Cautious debtor want to delay, condition (iii) above? Observe that if the Cautious debtor 
makes an offer to the creditor of  
( )
2
sπ δ−
, this will signal to the creditor the debtor type so that 
1 0q = ; and given 1 0q = , the creditor will choose to accept debtor’s offer. For the Cautious debtor to 
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want delay, therefore, requires that continuation value together with inside option Cω  is more 
attractive than settling, i.e. 
( ) ( )
2 2C
s sπ δ π δ
ω π
+ −
+ > − . This implies a lower bound on the inside 
option for the Optimist, as can be seen by rewriting this as (1 )Cω π δ> − . 
 
It is worth noting that, where the sustainability condition is common knowledge, this shifts bargaining 
power in favour of the Cautious debtor without any need for signalling. This reallocation does not, 
however, affect the MW condition given in section 2.1 for delay where there is uncertainty as to the 
growth of the pie, a point we formally verify in the appendix.   
 
2.3: The three period model 
 
This section shows how recovery and sustainability can each contribute to cumulative delay 
bargaining. By extending the bargaining model by an extra period, we find that extended delay can 
occur, first due to prospects of recovery and second due to signalling of sustainability concern. A 
consequence of this is that prolonged delay is associated with a larger haircut in the debt swap. 
 
In the three-period case, the timing of events is as follows: 
 
 Size of Pie  Proposer Outcome 
t = 1 Lπ    
 
debtor makes offer  
 
if offer accepted, game ends; 
 if offer rejected, game continues,  
and conditional on ϕ, nature chooses 
π  is { , }L Hπ π with prob. ,1p p− ; 
s is {0, }s with prob. 0 0,1q q− . 
 
t = 2:   Lπ  or Hπ  
 
with prob ½ debtor 
makes offer     
with prob ½ creditor 
makes offer     
if offer accepted game ends; 
if offer rejected, game continues to 
final period (with no intervention by 
nature) 
t= 3 Lπ  or Hπ   
 
with probability ½ 
debtor makes offer     
with probability ½ 
creditor makes offer     
if offer accepted game ends; 
if there is no agreement,  
there are disagreement payoffs of 
(0,0).  
 
We begin with the ultimatum game in the final period. At this stage, the size of the bargaining surplus 
is commonly known to both the debtor and the creditor. Denote the bargaining surplus by π . Let the 
posterior beliefs of the creditor over the two types of the debtor be denoted by 2q . Then, using an 
argument identical to that in section 2.2, the creditor’s offer, as a function of his beliefs, is:   
 
Creditor’s Belief 
as to debtor’s type 
Creditor’s offer Expected payoff for 
creditor 
2
sq π
π
−
>  
(it’s probably an Optimist) 
0 2qπ  
2
sq π
π
−
=  
 0 with probability θ and 
s  with probability (1-θ) 
2 (1 )( )q sθπ θ π+ − −  
2
sq π
π
−
<  s  sπ −  
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(it’s probably Cautious) 
 
 
As for the debtor, as before, his offer to the creditor is simply zero. From the perspective of t=2, the 
expected discounted payoffs are: 
 
Creditor’s Belief as to 
debtor’s type 
Expected payoff for debtor 
(for both types) 
Expected Payoff for creditor 
2
sq π
π
−
>  
(probably an Optimist) 
2
δπ  
 
2
2
qδπ  
2
sq π
π
−
=  ( (1 ) )
2
sδ π θ+ −  2( (1 )( ))
2
q sδ π θ π+ − −  
2
sq π
π
−
<  ( )
2
sδ π +   ( )
2
sδ π −  
 
When the debtor is chosen to make the offer at t=2, again by using an argument identical to that in 
section 2, in a separating equilibrium, the offer will be:  
 
 
Induced posterior 
beliefs for the 
creditor given the 
debtor’s offer 
Debtor’s payoff Offer to creditor Outcome 
2 1q =  (it’s an 
Optimist) 
Optimist: 
2
δππ −  
 
Optimist: 
2
δπ  
High offer will 
induce creditor 
to accept 
2 0q =  (it’s not) Cautious: 
2, 2 2D
sx δπ δπ π− > − +  
Cautious: 
( )
2, 2D
s
x
δ π −
<  
Offer too low to 
be accepted 
 
where  2,Dx  denotes the cautious debtor’s offer at t=2.  
 
When the creditor is chosen to make the offer at t=2, we claim that in a separating equilibrium, given 
that the optimist debtor accepts and the cautious debtor rejects, the creditor’s offer will be:  
 
Induced 
posterior 
beliefs for the 
creditor in a 
separating 
equilibrium 
Expected payoff to creditor Offer to 
debtor 
Outcome 
2 1q = , if 
debtor accepts; 
2 0q = , if 
debtor rejects 
 
( ) ( )
( )
0 0
2
1
2 2
s
q q
δ πδ π  −−   + −      
 
 
2
δπ  
Optimist 
accepts but 
cautious 
rejects 
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It is easy to see that the Optimistic debtor will accept the creditor’s offer as he is indifferent between 
accepting and rejecting the creditor’s offer. Moreover, the Cautious debtor will also reject the 
creditor’s offer as 
2
πδ <
( )
2
sδ π +
.  
 
In a separating equilibrium, the creditor makes an offer that the Optimist debtor accepts but a Cautious 
debtor rejects. We need to check that the creditor has no incentive to deviate by making an offer that 
either (i) both types of the debtor reject, and/or (ii) both types of the debtor accept. 
(i) If both types of the debtor reject, 2 0q q= and as long as 0
sq π
π
−
> , the creditor’s expected 
continuation payoff is 02
qδπ . We require that 
02
qδπ < ( ) ( )
( )
0 0
2
1
2 2
s
q q
δ πδ π  −−   + −      
  
which is always holds as ( )2
2 2
δ π δπ−
> . 
(ii) If the creditor makes an offer that both types of the debtor accept, then the lowest such offer is 
( )
2
sδ π +
which implies that the creditor’s payoff is
( )
2
sδ π
π
+
− .  
 
We require that 
 
( )
2
sδ π
π
+
− < ( ) ( )
( )
0 0
2
1
2 2
s
q q
δ πδ π  −−   + −      
  
which, by computation, simplifies to the inequality 
( ) ( ) ( )02 2q sδ π δ π δ π δπ − < − + − +  .  
 
Note that when 0q  is one, the inequality always holds while if 0q  is zero, the direction of the 
inequality is reversed. Moreover, the right hand side of the inequality is increasing in 0q . It follows 
that there exists a critical value  0q , 0< 0q <1, such that whenever 0q > 0q , the inequality 
( ) ( ) ( )02 2q sδ π δ π δ π δπ − < − + − +   is always satisfied.  
It follows that whenever 0q > 0max ,
sq π
π
 −
 
 
, a separating equilibrium with delay always exists. By 
computation, it follows that the continuation payoff to the creditor from rejecting the debtor’s current 
offer at t=1 denoted a is defined as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
0 0 0 0
2
0 0
1 1 1
2 2 2 2
(1 )
2 2 2
L L H Hs sa p q q p q q
E sE Eq q
δπ π δπ π
δ δ δ
δ πδ π δ π
          − −     = + − + − + −                             
−
= + − <
 
 
Suppose that following two inequalities are satisfied: 
(a) 
2L
a Eδπ π− < , 
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so the Optimistic debtor will delay in period 1; 
(b) 
( )2
2L
E s
a
δ π
π
+
− < , 
so the Cautious debtor will delay in period one. Then, providing the conditions for delay the 
penultimate period derived for the pure signalling case in Section 2.2 (i.e. 1 , { , }L H
s δ π π π
π δ
−
> ∈  so 
that 1s
E
δ
π δ
−
>  and, in addition, (1 )O Cω π δ ω< − < ) are also satisfied, there will be a positive 
probability of two-period delay in bargaining.  
 
Finally, note that along the equilibrium path of play, the creditor’s payoff is lower than with  one 
period delay. With one period delay, which occurs with probability 0q , the creditor’s expected payoff 
is 
2
Eδ π > 
( )2
2
E sδ π −
, the creditor’s expected payoff with two period delay. It follows that prolonged 
delay is positively correlated with a larger haircut in our model of a sovereign debt swap, the main 
result of the three period model.  
 
Section 3: Evidence of haircuts; two challenging cases; and policy implications  
 
3.1 Evidence of haircuts  
 
As MPST note, the distribution of haircuts in forty years of sovereign debt renegotiations is bi-modal. 
Using data from Cruces and Trebesch (2011), including all renegotiations with foreign banks and 
bondholders between 1970 and 2010, the histogram has peaks at haircuts of about 25% and 85%, as 
shown below. 
 
 
 
Figure 3  Distribution of haircuts. Source: Mariscal et al.(2015, p.17) 
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When they “filter the debt renegotiations taking out those that are donor funded (typically the HIPIC 
renegotiations) and those that are bank debt renegotiations then the distribution becomes smoother. 
Now taking this subset of bond renegotiations and considering the two types (those with and those 
without face value haircuts), we find that the average haircut of the former is some 50 percent while 
the average haircut of the latter is some 15 percent”. MPST(p.7) 
 
For bonded debt, Table 6 that follows illustrates this correlation between delay and haircuts. But it 
also indicates the heterogeneity of outcomes when sovereigns seek to restructure their debts.  
 
Sovereign 
State 
Restructuring 
Negotiations 
 
Default? 
"Delay" 
- after default 
Face 
Value, $b 
 
Haircut 
 
18 countries 
 
08/1982-5/1994 
  
141 months 
   
 30-35% 
Bonds only       
 
Argentina 
9/2003-4/2005 
19 months 
Yes 
12/2001 
 
40 months 
 
$79.7 
 
67% 
 
Russia 
11/1998-7/2000 
20 months 
Yes 
1/1999 
 
18 months 
 
$29.1 
 
69% 
 
Ecuador 
8/1999-8/2000 
12 months 
 
Yes 
 
12 months 
 
$6.5 
 
60% 
 
Ukraine 
1/2000-4/2000 
3 months 
 
Yes 
 
3 months 
 
$2.6 
 
40% 
 
Pakistan 
2/1999-12/1999 
10 months 
 
No 
 
- 
 
$0.6 
 
30% 
 
Uruguay 
4/2003-5/2003 
1 month 
 
No 
 
- 
 
$3.8 
 
26% 
Table 6: Sovereign Debt Restructurings with haircuts until 2005 
Sources: Table 14 and 15 in Sturzenegger and Zettlemeyer (2005)3; Table A.3 in Roubini and Setser 
(2004b); Table 1 in Bi (2008)  
 
To highlight the contrast between bank and bond when it comes to restructuring, earlier experience 
reported by Bi (2008) for sovereigns that restructured bank debt as well as bonds is briefly 
summarized in the first row.  The average delay of more than eleven years shown there includes the 
‘lost decade’ of Latin American growth, where US banks had to accumulate substantial reserves 
before writing-down around a third of their loans under the Brady Plan, as discussed by Cline (1995) 
and Merlo and Wilson(1998).  
 
                                                 
3 The losses that defaults have inflicted on creditors are largely based on the comparison between the (remaining) payment 
stream that was originally promised to investors and the payment stream associated with the restructured instruments, both 
discounted at a common interest (Sturzenegger and Zettlemeyer, 2007).Move to where it belongs? 
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The sovereign debt restructurings shown in rest of the table, ordered by length of delay after default, 
highlight the positive correlation of delay and write-down. While the average haircut is about 50 %, 
those with above average haircuts (Russia, Argentina and Ecuador) took the longest to resolve - 
suggestive evidence that negotiating a bigger haircut involves longer delay.  
 
In his investigation of ‘efficient delay’ Bi (2008) argues that the entire delay of 40 months shown for 
Argentina can be accounted for in terms of ‘waiting for recovery’ as in MW.  We would argue, 
however, that, following default in 2001, there were two separate phases leading up to the debt swap 
in 2005. First, from the beginning of 2002 to mid-2003, the Argentine economy was recovering 
strongly from deep recession and there appeared to be a consensus between debtor and creditors to 
await recovery (a consensus reinforced by the political difficulties faced by the regime in power 
pending Presidential elections).  As for the second phase, one could interpret the meagre offer made by 
Argentina in September 2003 as driven by sustainability concerns. In the context of our analysis, see 
Figure 2, this low offer was designed to be rejected - leading to further delay and a reappraisal of the 
debtor's type, and to a debt exchange that acknowledged these sustainability concerns. This was by no 
means the end of the restructuring, however, as we discuss in the next section. 
 
3.2 Two challenging cases: Argentina and Greece 
 
Argentina and the vulture funds  
 
As the debt exchange achieved by Argentina in 2005 involved only 76% of the bonds in default, 
negotiations continued -  leading to a second exchange in 2010, raising creditor participation to 93%. 
The Republic of Argentina treated the second swap as effectively a defeat for the holdouts, and made 
it clear that the remaining 7% would not receive any payment. The remaining holdouts included 
specialist funds4 determined not to accept any write-down, however: and, in circumstances where the 
debtor appeared to be challenging the authority of the US court handling the case, these funds - NML 
in particular - were able to secure an injunction to prevent the payment of coupons on the bonds 
already exchanged unless the claims of the holdouts were also paid as claimed. As this ‘Pari Passu’ 
injunction threatened to undermine all that had been achieved in previous restructurings, the Republic 
of Argentina  - after election of a new administration - finally agreed to a settlement with the principal 
holdouts in early 2016, Guzman (2016). 
 
Without question, much of this extra decade-long delay was due to the activities of holdout creditors, 
in particular those of the specialist funds. Before concluding that it is essential to include creditor 
heterogeneity – holdouts in particular – as a reason to expect delay in future, it is worth reflecting on 
how unusual this case has proved.  For the legal ingenuity exhibited by the specialist funds in 
relentless pursuit of their (highly profitable) claims has raised doubts as to the sustainability of the Pari 
Passu interpretation they obtained. It has, for example, been argued that, if holdouts can henceforth 
make claims for full settlement that rank equally with those of exchange bond holders who have 
accepted a haircut, then the process of ex post sovereign debt restructuring is doomed. One would 
have to wait forever to get any write-down! 
 
 Market sentiment does not, however, support this interpretation. Rather, it would seem, the Argentine 
case is being seen as an outlier, one where the battle between the debtor and holdouts was threatening 
the authority of the US courts, as discussed by Weidemaeier and McCarl ( 2014). It has been 
suggested, therefore, that the US courts may choose to limit the applicability of Argentine precedent 
when some of the remaining holdouts try to use it to secure the same rights as NML. If so, the 
Argentine episode may have little impact. 
 
Greece and the Troika  
                                                 
4 often referred to as vulture funds 
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The subsequent case of Greek debt restructuring does not fit the pattern that appears in Table 6. It was 
settled without default, involved a write-down of 69% on debt with face value of $199b, and was 
achieved after only 8 months of negotiation. The institutional differences between debt problems of a 
member of a currency union and those of stand-alone nation states like Argentina are surely relevant 
here. The Eurozone may be incomplete - a currency union without fiscal and banking union - but 
policy-makers of the so-called Troika (the Commission, the ECB and the IMF) were determined it 
should not fail. This hardly fits a model of a private creditor and a debtor state involved in bargaining 
with asymmetric information with no third  party intervention! 
 
How relevant in such a context are the factors we have discussed as favouring delay? The first - 
waiting for economic recovery, as per Merlo and Wilson - was over-ruled by the need to preserve the 
currency union. When a member country 'loses market-access', interest rates diverge sharply and there 
is a risk of contagion and cumulative crisis. So either the country must change its ways;5 or it should 
leave. 
 
The second reason, that delay can act as a signal of the need for debt restructuring, had little traction 
either. The IMF was closely involved in monitoring the situation; indeed it published a review in mid-
July 2011 concluding that Greece's outlook "does not allow the staff to deem debt to be sustainable 
with high probability." (Zettelmeyer et. al. (2013, p.5)). So the need for a haircut was clear enough; 
and the institutions involved were able to put pressure on creditors to accept the haircuts deemed 
necessary. 
 
The need to allow for the impact of third party intervention is only too evident in the Greek exchange; 
and it proved . successful in securing a large write-down in a short space of time. But in their report 
for the European Parliament on “The Troika and financial assistance in the euro area: successes and 
failures”, the authors observe drily : “In May 2010, Greece entered a stand-by agreement [with the 
IMF] and was therefore the first euro area country to fall under a “Troika” financial assistance 
programme. The performance of the programme disappointed in many respects and it can be rightly 
considered as the least successful one.”6 Sapir et al. (2015, p.29 ) 
 
3.3 Policy implications 
 
In terms of the analysis provided earlier, sustainability concerns may be signalled by delay; but this 
will only happen if the benefits to the debtor are sufficient to cover the cost of delay. The fact that 
MPST have uncovered - that there are so many repeat ‘reprofilings’ - suggests that the costs of using 
delay as a signal may be substantial.   
 
If their evidence means that delay is too costly, is there an alternative? The Greek case may have 
delivered a prompt restructuring but it hardly provides a tempting template. The experience of the 
Paris Club may be worth recalling in this context. For, as Sachs (1995) pointed, when negotiations 
were seen simply in terms of debt enforcement, this led to debt reductions which failed to give 
countries a ‘fresh start’. So the same debtor countries frequently reappeared seeking further 
concessions. A key idea that Sachs (2002) discussed was to use the Millenium Development Goals as 
a benchmark; so a restructuring would be judged inadequate if it failed to help the debtor make 
progress with these goals. The paper by Cheng et. al. (2016) takes a 60 year view of the operations of 
                                                 
5 "The Greek debt crisis began in October 2009, when the newly elected government of George Papandreou revealed that 
the country had understated its debt and deficit figures for years. The projected budget deficit for 2009, in particular, was 
revised upwards from an estimated 7 per cent to more than 12 per cent (it eventually ended up at 15.6 per cent)." 
(Zettelmeyer et al. (2013, p.4) 
6 The report goes on to quote an earlier assessment that “ IMF and the EU bet on the materialisation of optimistic tax 
revenue and privatisation assumptions. Instead of formulating a robust programme capable of withstanding adverse 
economic, political and financial developments, they did just the opposite. It is no surprise that these optimistic 
assumptions were not vindicated by events.” Sapir et al. (2015, p.29 ) 
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the Paris Club and, as the title suggests, charts a significant shift before and after 1980 - a shift “from 
debt collector to relief provider”; and attempts to measure the success of this change of focus - in 
terms of achieving economic growth in particular.  
 
The sovereign debtors involved in the Paris Club negotiations are typically heavily indebted poor 
countries, however. What of countries with middle or higher incomes? What criteria might signal 
appropriate restructuring for them? When Argentina went into default at the end of 2001, Anne 
Kreuger took the bull by the horns by advocating a form of sovereign bankruptcy procedure, 
analogous to what domestic bankruptcy law provides for corporations and municipalities. Her 
proposal, Kreuger (2002), gave a central role to the IMF, which would naturally have a data available 
on the country7 and its problems (and has unparalleled experience of providing support – with 
conditions - to countries in financial trouble). The proposal was not adopted, however, largely because 
the US Treasury was not convinced: a key issue being that the IMF would face a conflict of interest 
being both judge and creditor. Potentially, the IMF could resolve uncertainty about future growth or 
sustainability concerns when these are in dispute. But this same conflict of interest may preclude the 
IMF from acting as a neutral assessor of restructuring needs.  
 
Consider a simple extension of the model studied above which differentiates between an official 
senior creditor (such as the IMF) and private bondholders whose claims are subordinate. Assume that 
bargaining surplus over which the debtor and the private bondholder bargain over, π , is the residual 
amount available after any payments to IMF are made. As a senior creditor, the IMF’s claim on 
resources will reduce the bargaining surplus π  available. As this will have the effect of exaggerating 
the significance of debtor's sustainability constraint s  over which the private bondholder and the 
debtor can bargain, it will tend to make delay more or not less likely. Hence, given its senior creditor 
status, the IMF may not be able to play the role of disinterested assessor who can reduce delay.   
 
The alternative to institutional reform that the US Treasury pursued was to advocate renegotiable 
contracts - specifically, Collective Action Clauses in sovereign debt instruments so that a 
supermajority of creditors could, after default, engineer debt restructuring as they judged appropriate. 
The apparent success of the contractual approach has encouraged further proposals.  
 
Brooke et al. (2013), a paper by economists at the Bank of Canada and Bank of England, for example, 
makes the case for ‘sovereign cocos’ to ease liquidity crises, where the provision of emergency 
funding by the IMF would trigger a rollover by private bondholders. For issues of solvency, the 
authors advocate the issuance of GDP linked bonds8. Such state-contingent contracts, long advocated 
by Robert Shiller, have been positively assessed in a study byBarr et al. (2014) at the Bank of 
England;  and have been strongly  endorsed by Blanchard and De Mauro (2016),  arguing that this 
would assist European countries handle the debt overhang.  
 
Section  4:   Conclusion 
 
With the exception of Greece, the pattern of recent sovereign debt restructurings has been that 
considerable delay is involved in securing a substantial haircut. Consistent with the evidence in 
Mariscal et. al. (2015), we develop a bargaining model to account for this. With a stochastic 
bargaining surplus and asymmetric information about the debtor's sustainability concern, we show that 
multi-period delay can occur, initially reflecting recovery followed by signalling about sustainability; 
and that prolonged delay is positively correlated with a large haircut. 
 
                                                 
7 Blustein (2005) provides discussion on the official sustainability assessments of Argentina made by the IMF but kept 
confidential. 
8 GDP  linked warrants were issued by both Argentina and Greece: but this was ex post, and the contracts suffered from a 
marked novelty premium, estimated at 800 bps. 
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These are by no means the only factors to be considered, however. The Greece case highlights the 
importance of third party intervention, for example.  Possible institutional development, problems of 
creditor coordination and prospects for contractual innovation are further issues in sovereign debt 
restructuring clearly worth exploring.  
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Appendix: An innite horizon bargaining model
with delay
In this section, we model bargaining between a representative private
bondholder and a sovereign debtor who is already in default.
The model and key results
As in the three period model, conditional on default, there is bargain-
ing between debtor and a representative private bondholder (referred to
as the "creditor") over the terms of debt restructuring where the total
tax revenue available for bargaining as , where  > 0 and the value
of  at the initial period, is low (denoted by L). The future value of
 can continue to be low at L with probability p or grow to a higher
level, H , with probability 1  p. The sustainability constraint, s, repre-
sents the minimum fraction of the tax revenue required by the sovereign
debtor consistent with economic and political stability (ensured by a
minimum threshold level of public good provision) of the debtor state.
We will assume that there is incomplete information about the sustain-
ability constraint so that the sustainability constraint determines the
type of the debtor: Optimistic and Cautious corresponding to s = 0 and
s = s > 0 respectively where L   s > 0 and payo¤s of the two debtor
types (as function of the share of bargaining surplus) is the same as in
the main text. We consider the case where bargaining takes place over a
number of time periods t = 1; 2; 3:::. Formally, a state of the world con-
sists of a pair (; s) where  2 fL; Hg and s 2 f0; sg. Conditional on
realization of the state of the world at the beginning of t = 1, the debtor
and the private bondholder both attach a probability of fp; 1  pg over
fL; Hg. The bondholder attaches a probability fq0; 1  q0g over f0; sg
while the debtor knows the realization of the value of the sustainability
constraint. We assume that the uncertainty with respect to  and with
respect to debtors type are resolved at t = 2. The debtors type is
revealed to the debtor but not the private creditor.
We assume that the sovereign debtor makes the o¤er at t = 1, but, in
the subsequent periods, each party has an equal probability of making
an o¤er (being the proposer). O¤ers are made at discrete points in time,
namely, at times 1; 2; 3; ::. An o¤er is a number greater than or equal
to zero and less than or equal to . If the o¤er is accepted, the game
ends; otherwise, the game continues to the next period. This process
continues until the o¤er is accepted.
For ease of exposition we will assume that both debtors and creditors
have a common discount factor  < 1. In any period in which there is
disagreement, the debtor is excluded from access to the international
capital market. Formally, the disagreement payo¤s are zero for both
players.
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The timing of events is summarized in Table A1 below.
Size of  Debtors type Proposer Outcome
t = 1 L
Sustainability
constraint
revealed to
sovereign debtor.
Debtor makes o¤er
If o¤er accepted,
game ends.
If o¤er rejected,
game continues:
t = 2
Uncertainty
over 
is resolved.
Debtor makes
o¤er with prob. 1
2
Creditor makes
o¤er with prob. 1
2
If o¤er accepted,
game ends.
If o¤er rejected,
game continues:
t = 3; :::
Debtor makes
o¤er with prob. 1
2
Creditor makes
o¤er with prob. 1
2
If o¤er accepted,
game ends.
If o¤er rejected,
game continues.
Table A1: Timing of events
In order to distinguish between one and two period delay, we look
at two distinct cases corresponding to di¤erent information structures:
(1) the bargaining surplus, , can change over time with some proba-
bility but the debtors type (i.e. the debtors sustainability constraint)
is known and (2)  can change over time and, in addition, there is an
asymmetric information about the debtors type (i.e. 0 < q0 < 1).
Note that, formally, the two cases correspond to two distinct incom-
plete information models with di¤erent information structures. We solve
for the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium for each of the two models.
Case 1: Stochastic Bargaining Surplus when the debtors
sustainability constraint is common knowledge
In this case, at t = 1 the debtors type is known: the debtor is either
Optimistic or Cautious. We begin by calculating the equilibrium payo¤s
for the creditor and the debtor when there is complete information about
debtors type and the value of  is known at period t = 2.
First, let us consider the case where the debtor is Optimistic. Let xCR
and xO denote the payo¤s for the Optimistic debtor when the creditor
and the debtor are the proposers, respectively, and let  xCR and  xO
denote the share of the available bargaining surplus for the creditor. In
the equilibrium, either party will agree to a debt restructuring proposal
if the proposal o¤ers the party at least as much in discounted present
value as it can expect to attain by waiting until the next period, given
the strategies of both parties. Therefore, to compute the payo¤s for the
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creditor and the Optimistic debtor, the following two equations need to
be solved:
xCR =

2
(xCR + xO) ; (A1)
   xO = 
2
(   xCR +    xO) : (A2)
Equations (A1) and (A2) have a unique solution, given by (xO; x

CR):
xO =
2  
2
 and xCR =

2
: (A3)
In equilibrium, the Optimistic debtor o¤ers    xO = 2 to the
creditor and the creditors o¤er is xCR =

2
. Given that each party has
an equal probability of making an o¤er (being the proposer), it follows
that the expected payo¤s for the Optimistic debtor and the creditor are
given by
 

2
; 
2

, respectively.
The Cautious debtor has concern about the sustainability of any set-
tlement. The presence of a sustainability constraint reduces the amount
of surplus that is available for bargaining from  to   s while the cau-
tious debtor always keeps s. Then, using the same logic as above, an
agreement is reached instantaneously and the expected payo¤s for the
debtor and the creditor are
  
+s
2

;
 
 s
2

, respectively.
Next we calculate the condition for delay when the sustainability
constraint for the debtor is common knowledge but the size of  is un-
known.
Optimistic debtor : The best o¤er that the Optimistic debtor can
make is the excess of the available bargaining surplus over his own con-
tinuation value, given by L  E2 . If this o¤er falls below the creditors
continuation value, E
2
, this o¤er will not be accepted. Formally, the
condition for the rst-period delay for the Optimistic debtor is given by:
L   E
2
<
E
2
, 1

<
E
L
;
Let Eg denote the expected growth of the economy where Eg = (E L)
L
and r = 1 

denote the discount rate. Note that
1

<
E
L
, r < Eg:
Therefore, in this case, delay occurs if expected growth of the economy,
Eg, exceeds the time rate of discount, dened as r = (1 )

..
Cautious Debtor: The best o¤er that the Cautious debtor can make
is the excess of the available bargaining surplus over his own continua-
tion value, given by L   (E+s)2 . If this o¤er falls below the creditors
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continuation value, (E s)
2
, this o¤er will not be accepted. Formally, the
condition for the rst-period delay for the Cautious debtor is given by:
L    (E + s)
2
<
 (E   s)
2
, 1

<
E
L
, r < Eg:
Note that for either debtor type, the condition for delay is the same:
with relatively expected low growth prospects, there is immediate agree-
ment. This condition for one-period delay is essentially the same as that
in Merlo-Wilson.
Case 2: Stochastic Bargaining Surplus and Asymmetric
Information About the Sustainability Constraint
Next, we study the case where, in addition to  changing over time,
there is an asymmetric information about the debtors type. We show
that there is a mixed strategy equilibrium with two period delay along
the equilibrium path of play, initially to permit for economic recovery
followed by signalling about the sustainability constraint.
We begin with period t = 3. Let the posterior beliefs of the creditor
over the two types of the debtor be denoted by q1. In Table A2, we
consider the creditors o¤ers at extreme values of q1.
Creditors belief
as to debtors type
Creditors o¤er
to debtor
Payo¤ for
creditor
q1 = 1
(Optimist)

2
   
2
q1 = 0
(Cautious)
( s)
2
(   s)  ( s)
2
Table A2: Creditors o¤ers to debtor at t = 3 with extreme beliefs
For less extreme beliefs, i.e. 0 < q1 < 1, the creditors expected
payo¤ from a high o¤er of ( s)
2
, which is acceptable to both types of
debtor, will be
 
2 
2

(   s), while the creditors expected payo¤ from a
low o¤er of 
2
, which is only acceptable to the Optimistic debtor, will be
q1
 
   
2

. If q1
 
   
2

>
 
2 
2

(   s), the creditor will do better by
making a low o¤er but otherwise for q1
 
   
2

<
 
2 
2

(   s). When
q1
 
   
2

=
 
2 
2

(   s), the two o¤ers give the creditor the same
expected payo¤. This condition implies that q1 =  s . Since 0 < s < ,
it follows that q1 < 1.
The creditors o¤ers as a function of his belief are shown in the table
below:
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Creditors belief
as to debtors type
Creditors o¤er
to debtor
Expected payo¤
for creditor
q1 >
 s

(Probably an Optimist)

2
q1
 
   
2

q1   s
(Probably Cautious)
( s)
2
 
2 
2

(   s)
As for the debtor, the Optimistic debtors o¤er to the creditor is 
2
,
while the Cautious debtors o¤er to the creditor is ( s)
2
.
From the perspective of the second period, given the common dis-
count factor  and bearing in mind that each player has a 50% probabil-
ity of being a proposer, the continuation values for the debtor and the
creditor are given by:
Creditors belief
as to debtors type
Continuation
values for debtor
Continuation
values for creditor
q1 >
 s

(Likely an Optimist)

2

2

q1
 
2 
2

 + 
2

q1   s
(Likely Cautious)
(+s)
2
( s)
2
One observation that arises from the preceeding table is that, when
q1 ! 1, the continuation value for the creditor approaches 2 as in the
case with complete information about debtors type.
Moving backwards, we now consider the bargaining at t = 2. There
is an asymmetric information about the debtors type. Let us x q1 for
which the continuation values for the creditors are as in the preceeding
table. The continuation values for the creditor and the debtor corre-
sponding to such continuation belief of the creditor as to the debtors
type are given by ( s)
2
and (+s)
2
, respectively.
Fix  2 fL; Hg. We will now construct a continuation PBE mixed
strategy equilibrium where at least one of the two debtor types and the
creditor randomize at t = 2. Note that for the creditor to randomize at
t = 2, it must be the case that q1 =  s .
Suppose that the debtor is chosen to make an o¤er at t = 2. Let
(x2;    x2) denote the o¤er made by the debtor. Suppose that ~x2 =
(+s)
2
; then, by computation,
   ~x2 =

2  
2

   s
2
>
 (   s)
2
:
Let x02 be any positive number such that    x02 < ( s)2 .
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The Optimistic debtor o¤ers (~x2;    ~x2) with a probability (1  )
and o¤ers (x02;    x02) with a probability , while the Cautious debtor
o¤ers (x02;    x02) with a probability 1. The posterior belief of the cred-
itor at t = 3, which is q1 =  s , can be obtained using the Bayesian
updating rule: q1 =
q0
q0+(1 q0) , where q0 is the creditors belief at t = 2
is simply her prior belief. It follows that
q0
q0 + (1  q0) =
   s

: (A4)
Solving equation (A4) for  yields:
(; s) =

   s
s

1  q0
q0

> 0:
Since we need ()  1, the following condition is required to be
satised: 
   s
s

1  q0
q0

 1;
or, equivalently,
 (1  q0)  s, q0     s

. (A5)
As long as q0 >  s ,  2 fL; Hg, there exists  2 (0; 1) which
solves equation (A4). It follows that, for the creditor, by observing x02,
q1 =
 s

. Given q1 =  s , creditor is indi¤erent between accepting
(~x2;    ~x2) and rejecting it and obtains his continuation value.
From condition (A5), we must have q0 >  s . If the creditor is
chosen to make the o¤er at t = 2, the creditor o¤ers (~x2;    ~x2) and the
Optimist debtor accepts the o¤er with probability  (; s) and Cautious
Debtor rejects the o¤er with probability one.
Clearly, given the preceding computations, both debtor types are
choosing a best-response and given the debtors strategy and the condi-
tion that prior probability satises the inequality q0 >  s , the creditor
cannot do better either. The condition that q0 >  s has the interpre-
tation that the creditor attaches a su¢ ciently high probability to the
debtor being an Optimist.
To summarize:
(i) Under the assumption that q0 > H sH (as
 s

is increasing in ),
at t = 2:
(a) If the debtor is chosen to make the o¤er: The Optimistic debtor of-
fers (~x2;    ~x2) with a probability (1   (; s)) and o¤ers (x02;    x02)
with a probability  (; s). The Cautious debtor o¤ers (x02;    x02) with
a probability 1. The creditor accepts the o¤er (~x2;    ~x2) with proba-
bility 1 and rejects the o¤er (x02;    x02) with a probability 1;
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(b) If the creditor is chosen to make the o¤er: the creditor o¤ers
(~x2;    ~x2) and the Optimist debtor accepts the o¤er with probability
 (; s) and Cautious Debtor rejects the o¤er with probability one.
(ii) At t = 3, the creditors belief as to the debtors type is q1 =  s :
The creditors payo¤ is ( s)
2
. The debtors payo¤ is (+s)
2
.
Moving to t = 1, we calculate the continuation values for the creditor
and both debtor types. The continuation payo¤ for the creditor is
ba= q0 (1   (; s)) (   ex2) +  (; s)  (   s)
2

+ (1  q0)  (   s)
2
(A6)
=
 (   s)
2
+ q0(1  )(1   (; s)):
The continuation payo¤ for both debtor types is (+s)
2
.
In the rst period, the sovereign debtor is a proposer. It follows,
by computation, that the expected continuation payo¤ for the creditor
(from rejecting the debtors o¤er at t = 1) is given by
Ea^ =
2 (E   s)
2
+ q0(1  )E [(1   (; s))] : (A7)
Next, we derive the conditions which make delay becomes attractive
for each type of debtor. For both debtor types the best o¤er is the excess
of the available bargaining surplus over his own continuation value, i.e.
L   
h
(E+s)
2
i
. If such o¤er falls below the expected payo¤ for the
creditor, Ea^, the debtors o¤er will not be accepted.
To show the correlation between delay and size of the haircut in
sovereign debt, as already noted, for each ,    ~x2 =
 
2 
2

   s
2
>
( s)
2
. Therefore, the creditors expected payo¤ from one period delay
is greater than the creditors expected payo¤ from two period delay.
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